Whispering-gallery-mode dye laser emission from liquid in a capillary fiber

Bibliography: p. 153-170.The nature of optical whispering-gallery-mode resonances in a layered microcylinder is investigated numerically by studying the scattering characteristics and the internal electromagnetic fields of a normally-illuminated cladded dielectric fiber calculated using the boundary-value method. Computed resonant mode configurations are compared to the better-known results for homogeneous spheres and cylinders and coated spheres. It is shown that high-Q whispering-gallery-mode resonances can be supported by the curved interface between the core and cladding regions of a layered fiber if the core refractive index is sufficiently greater than that of the outer layer, and that these modes can be directly related to the so-called morphology-dependent resonances of a homogeneous cylinder of the same size and relative refractive index as the fiber core. The implications of these resonant modes for inelastic optical processes are made clear by developing a model for optical emissions from a molecule in the core of a capillary fiber. The results of the model show that the transition rates of molecules in the fiber core and near to the core/cladding interface are enhanced at frequencies corresponding to cavity resonances. It is shown experimentally that these high-Q cavity modes can be excited to above the threshold for laser emission by providing gain in the fiber core material. We have used a refractive dye-doped solvent as a gain medium and a fused-silica capillary to form the resonant cavity. Upon optical excitation of the dye by illuminating the fiber normally with the green beam from a frequency-doubled Nd:YAG laser, laser emission is emitted from the fiber core in the plane perpendicular to the fiber axis. We explain the novel spatial and spectral dependences of the laser emission in terms of the calculated frequencies and Q-values of the resonant cavity modes and the bulk properties of the cavity medium. We show that the thresholds observed in the laser system can be explained using a simplified rate-equation approach, and that this also explains some of the other observed features of the emissions. The heating of the dye solvent during a laser pulse has an observable effect on the resonance mode locations due to the temperature dependence of the refractive index. We demonstrate the use of observed laser spectra to determine the size and taper of the capillary fiber core

Cartel Quotas Under Majority Rule

We examine the choice of quotas by legal volume-restricting organizations: domestic and international cartels, commodity organizations, U.S. Federal agricultural marketing boards, and prorationing boards. Unlike their illegal counterparts, legal cartels have published regulations and broader enforcement capabilities. Differences in costs and size among cartel members, however, still make quota selection contentious. Conflicts over quotas are typically resolved by voting. Cartel regulations usually require that quotas be chosen in the following manner: a scalar (depending on context capacity, inventory, historical output or historical exports) is assigned to each entity subject to regulation. Cartel members then vote on the common percentage of each scalar which is the maximum the entity may sell. Sidepayments to influence votes are prohibited. We examine the predicted effects of this real-world institution on prices and welfare and compare the equilibrium outcomes to what would occur if joint profits were instead maximized. We also show the economic consequences of exogenous political charges such as alterations in the foting weights or in the identiy of the voters.Center for Research on Economic and Social Theory, Department of Economics, University of Michiganhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/100661/1/ECON135.pd

Cartels That Vote: Agricultural Marketing Boards and Induced Voting Behavior

Our goal in this research project is to understand the behavior of administrative committees authorized to restrict volume. Understanding this behavior is interesting in its own right and in addition may clarify how other cartels operate. Like every cartel, these administrative committees must grapple with difficult collective choice problems; however, they are not burdened with the enforcement problems that beset the typical cartel. Administrative committees afford students of cartel behavior three advantages: (1) their collective choice mechanism (majority-rule voting) is explicity, (2) their meetings are open to the public, and (3) their public records reveal how each committee member voted on each proposed volume restriction (no matter whether it passed or failed).Center for Research on Economic and Social Theory, Department of Economics, University of Michiganhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/100660/1/ECON134.pd

A Median Choice Theorem

This paper presents a Median Voter Theorem for a class of one-dimensional voting situations where individual preferences need not be single-peaked, but nonetheless satisfy a strong regularity condition. This condition arises when cartels with identical marginal costs vote on quotas [Cave and Salant, 1987] and also arises in the case of both agricultural marketing boards and prorationing boards restricting extraction from common properties.Center for Research on Economic and Social Theory, Department of Economics, University of Michiganhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/100659/1/ECON133.pd

Prisoners of our own Device – an evolutionary perspective on lock-in, technology clusters and telecom regulation

Economic analysis of telecom-related issues often takes an essentially static equilibrium perspective, using comparative statics or moment-to-moment sequences of equilibrium behavior to model the development and impacts of technologies, economic behavior and regulation. Of course, much if not all of these developments occur far from equilibrium; this paper argues for resurrecting a more evolutionary perspective – in particular by taking account of dynamic rigidities. The models involved are not new – in the economic literature their formal development dates back at least to the work of David (1974), Desi (1982) Winter (1982), Arthur (1984) and Farrell and Saloner (1985). Taken together, these articles demonstrated the possibility of lock-in (especially to a given technology or supplier) in the presence of complementarities. A related thread in the game-theoretic literature analyses the evolution and stability of conventions, generally in coordination games. The implications for positive analysis are fairly straightforward; change is likely to be discontinuous and path-dependent, and (evolutionary) equilibrium outcomes are not necessarily optimal. This has equally straightforward implications for policy analysis and development; governance and regulation are periodically subject to by intentional or accidental change. Often, the intent of those participating in the change is to initiate, influence or set the seal on technical, economic and/or regulatory developments. Their deliberations are often sophisticated, taking account of the optimal responses of other stakeholders – but in the presence of rigidities, these assumptions about freedom of choice may not hold; the ability to recognize and respond to challenges is strongly path-dependent. This is particularly true in relation to markets with network externalities, which – as Katz and Shapiro (1992, 1994) observed - tend towards ‘tipping’ into monopoly and polarization of responses to innovation between excess inertia (lock-in to incumbent technology) and excess volatility (rushing to the ‘next big thing’). These phenomena are not limited to specific interoperability concerns identified by early authors in the field

Quis custodiet ipsos custodies in the Internet: self-regulation as a threat and a promise

ICT domains have always been subject to technical, economic and/or societal regulation. The traditional basis was a 'governance gap' between economically-motivated activities and external consequences for other firms, end-users, public services, etc. Recent changes in European market and societal contexts and policy initiatives have triggered a reconsideration of this basis. Four developments are particularly challenging: enterprise convergence and divergence that reshape market and sector boundaries; evolution of 'converged' regulators; new regulatory concerns (IPR enforcement, RFID, net neutrality); and changes in the policy context. These combine to lay the foundation for cross-cutting reviews and rebalancing of regulatory roles and responsibilities with profound structural and dynamic implications. This has been largely confined to formal regulation while much governance is provided by a spectrum of self- and co-regulatory organisations (hereafter referred to as XROs). This paper analyses XRO roles, functions and impacts and their implications for regulatory postures more supportive of overarching policy objectives, more transparent and accountable, more flexible in response to technological and other changes, less burdensome to those regulated and less likely to distort market evolution. It draws on a review of the self-regulation literature in a wide range of contexts, including financial services and professional self-regulation, 21 extended case studies of Internet XROs, an analytic treatment of the determinants and impacts of XRO formation, agenda-setting, rules, monitoring, enforcement and compliance; and a policy analysis of the scope for regulatory engagement with XROs and methods for option development and ex ante evaluation. Particular issues concern: the degree to which XROs form around specific issues, market segments, personalities or action modes (e.g. standardisation); whether different types of statutory or XRO governance are likely to adopt more stringent or more cost-effective rules; whether different arrangements are more vulnerable to capture or corruption; and whether compliance will be higher under specific types of arrangements. Public policy and the peer-reviewed literature converge on the recognition that there is always a price to be paid for regulation in the form of distortion, cost, institutionalisation, agenda creep and so on. This must be offset against justifying benefits, which may mean extending or shrinking regulation in various areas, rebalancing rule-making and rule-enforcing, delegating or clawing back responsibility, etc. It is necessary to reassess how, but whether and even why regulation should be done. Generally, this calls for some evolved form of, or alternative to, regulation. The paper presents six specific findings and associated recommendations for policy formulation

Quis custodiet ipsos custodies in the Internet: self-regulation as a threat and a promise

ICT domains have always been subject to technical, economic and/or societal regulation. The traditional basis was a 'governance gap' between economically-motivated activities and external consequences for other firms, end-users, public services, etc. Recent changes in European market and societal contexts and policy initiatives have triggered a reconsideration of this basis. Four developments are particularly challenging: enterprise convergence and divergence that reshape market and sector boundaries; evolution of 'converged' regulators; new regulatory concerns (IPR enforcement, RFID, net neutrality); and changes in the policy context. These combine to lay the foundation for cross-cutting reviews and rebalancing of regulatory roles and responsibilities with profound structural and dynamic implications. This has been largely confined to formal regulation while much governance is provided by a spectrum of self- and co-regulatory organisations (hereafter referred to as XROs). This paper analyses XRO roles, functions and impacts and their implications for regulatory postures more supportive of overarching policy objectives, more transparent and accountable, more flexible in response to technological and other changes, less burdensome to those regulated and less likely to distort market evolution. It draws on a review of the self-regulation literature in a wide range of contexts, including financial services and professional self-regulation, 21 extended case studies of Internet XROs, an analytic treatment of the determinants and impacts of XRO formation, agenda-setting, rules, monitoring, enforcement and compliance; and a policy analysis of the scope for regulatory engagement with XROs and methods for option development and ex ante evaluation. Particular issues concern: the degree to which XROs form around specific issues, market segments, personalities or action modes (e.g. standardisation); whether different types of statutory or XRO governance are likely to adopt more stringent or more cost-effective rules; whether different arrangements are more vulnerable to capture or corruption; and whether compliance will be higher under specific types of arrangements. Public policy and the peer-reviewed literature converge on the recognition that there is always a price to be paid for regulation in the form of distortion, cost, institutionalisation, agenda creep and so on. This must be offset against justifying benefits, which may mean extending or shrinking regulation in various areas, rebalancing rule-making and rule-enforcing, delegating or clawing back responsibility, etc. It is necessary to reassess how, but whether and even why regulation should be done. Generally, this calls for some evolved form of, or alternative to, regulation. The paper presents six specific findings and associated recommendations for policy formulation

Cyber-Trust

Trust pervades the economic and societal interactions on which the Information Society is built. This paper applies economic analysis to issues of trust and identifies trust considerations affecting market structure, conduct and performance. The analysis highlights the impact of ISTs and the impact on a range of stakeholders